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CONTENTSAbstract
This paper brings together empirical research on price and wage dynamics
for the Portuguese economy based both on micro and macro data. As regards
￿rms’ pricing behaviour the most noticeable ￿nding is that prices in Portugal
are somewhat less ￿exible than in the United States but more ￿exible than in
the Euro Area. Regarding ￿rms’ wage setting practices, we uncover evidence
favouring the hypothesis of aggregate and disaggregate wage ￿exibility. Despite
the existence of mandatory minimum wages, the presence of binding wage ￿oors
and the general use of extension mechanisms, the ￿rms still retain some ability
to circumvent collective agreements via the mechanism of the wage cushion. The
evidence also suggests that Portuguese wages behave in a fashion consistent with
the wage curve literature, but the responsiveness of real wages to unemployment
changes may have declined over the last decade.
JEL classi￿cation: C42, D40, E31, J30.
Key words: Survey data, wage and price rigidities, persistence, wage cushion.
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The existence of wage and price rigidities is widely recognised as a critical issue
for macroeconomics and, most notably, for monetary policy design. On the theoretical
front, recent literature - of which Erceg et al. (2000), Christiano et al. (2005), Levin
et al. (2005) and Blanchard and Gal￿ (2007) are sensible examples - has emphasized
the importance of price and wage rigidities for the evolution of the macro economy in
response to shocks. On the empirical front, there is now a large bulk of evidence on
the existence of price and nominal wage rigidities, for which the economic theory pro-
vides several explanations (existence of menu costs, explicit and/or implicit contracts,
coordination failure, etc.).
This paper brings together empirical evidence on price and wage dynamics for
the Portuguese economy based both on micro and macro data. The analysis involves
recent ￿ndings on price and wage setting practices, as well as evidence on persistence
of wage and price in￿ation. The paper starts by documenting the main features of
￿rms’ price and wage setting practices employing the quantitative individual price
data underlying o￿cial consumer (CPI) and producer (PPI) price indices, as well as
qualitative information from surveys of ￿rms. In particular, the monthly frequency
of price changes, the duration of wage and price spells, the speed of price reaction to
demand and cost shocks, the synchronisation of price and wage changes, and the main
explanations behind infrequent wage and price adjustments are investigated.
The paper then proceeds by addressing di￿erent aspects concerning the process of
wage formation in Portugal resorting to econometric evidence based on micro data.
In the process of wage formation, wages are determined through a bargaining process
between ￿rms and employees (or the labour unions) and the leeway for negotiations is
determined by the conditions underlying company survival and by the workers’ reser-
vation wage. In general, it is the bargaining power of the parties that ultimately de-
termines the ￿nal outcome. But, the bargaining power depends on a variety of factors,
among them risk aversion (say, with respect to income ￿uctuations), the capacity to
in￿ict costs on employers (for example, through industrial action), the composition of
the workforce (e.g., in terms of insiders and outsiders), or the existence of asymmetric
information (for example about the company’s economic performance). Against this
background, some features of the Portuguese labour market deemed to be relevant for
wage setting, such as the characteristics of the wage bargaining system, the impact of
minimum wages on employment, the determinants of the wage cushion (the di￿erence
between the actual wage and the bargained wage), the consequences for wages stem-
ming from ￿rm closures or the treat of unemployment, and the cyclical behaviour of
real wages are investigated. Despite the rigidity imposed by the existence of mandatory
minimum wages, the presence of binding wage ￿oors determined by collective agree-
ments, and the general use of extension mechanisms, the ￿rms still retain the ability
to circumvent wage agreements via the mechanism of the wage cushion.
Finally, the paper focuses on the dynamics of aggregate wages and prices. In the
real world, the existence of price and wage rigidities is expected to translate into
5
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hitting the economy. Thus, this section reports the evidence on persistence of the
responses of wages and prices to di￿erent types of shocks by comparing the evidence for
Portugal with similar evidence for the euro area (EA) and the United States (US). As
regards ￿rms’ pricing behaviour the most noticeable ￿nding is that, in the Portuguese
economy, prices are somewhat less ￿exible than in the US but more ￿exible than
in the EA. Regarding ￿rms’ wage setting practices, we uncovered evidence favouring
the hypothesis of aggregate wage ￿exibility. Portuguese wages behave in a fashion
consistent with the Wage Curve literature. In its static interpretation, a 10 percent
increase in the unemployment rate generates a 1 percent decrease in real wage. Recent
evidence from both aggregate and disaggregate wage data, however, suggests that the
responsiveness of real wages to unemployment changes may have declined over the last
decade. The indication of a fall in the cyclical sensitivity of wages may be associated
to the nature of the current mechanisms for wage determination in a low-in￿ation
environment (in particular under severe nominal downward rigidity of wages).
6
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The existence of wage and price rigidities is widely recognised as a critical issue for
macroeconomics and, most notably, for monetary policy design. On the theoretical
front, recent literature - of which Erceg et al. (2000), Christiano et al. (2005), Levin
et al. (2005) and Blanchard and Gal￿ (2007) are sensible examples - has emphasized
the importance of price and wage rigidities for the evolution of the macro economy in
response to shocks. On the empirical front, there is now a large bulk of evidence on
the existence of price and nominal wage rigidities, for which the economic theory pro-
vides several explanations (existence of menu costs, explicit and/or implicit contracts,
coordination failure, etc.).
This paper brings together empirical evidence on price and wage dynamics for the
Portuguese economy based both on micro and macro data. The analysis, conducted
from di￿erent but complementary standpoints, involves recent ￿ndings on price and
wage setting practices, as well as evidence on persistence of wage and price in￿ation.
The paper starts by documenting the main features of ￿rms’ price and wage setting
practices by using evidence based on individual price data underlying o￿cial consumer
(CPI) and producer (PPI) price indices, as well as qualitative information from surveys
of ￿rms. In particular, the monthly frequency of price changes, the duration of wage and
price spells, the speed of price reaction to demand and cost shocks, the synchronisation
of price and wage changes, and the main explanations behind infrequent wage and price
adjustments are investigated.
The paper then proceeds by addressing di￿erent aspects concerning the process of
wage formation in Portugal resorting to econometric evidence based on micro data.
The Portuguese labour is characterised by a number of distinctive features. First and
foremost, we con￿rmed an extreme level of nominal wage rigidity (see, for instance,
Dickens et al. (2007)). This nominal rigidity is associated with barriers to a nominal
fall in wages (legal, contractual and others). Indeed, since the 1950s, nominal wage cuts
are forbidden in Portugal. This restriction, however, does not create insurmountable
restrictions for companies seeking real wage concessions below the in￿ation rate. In
such a case it will be enough to ensure that a nominal wage up-date is below in￿ation.
The higher the in￿ation rate, the more leeway on wages is available for companies.
Another interesting characteristic of the Portuguese labour market is that ￿rms often
pay their workers above the contractual wage, ensuring a wage cushion which has
served as an important mechanism for wage ￿exibility (Cardoso and Portugal (2005)).
However, in the context of the current low-in￿ation regime, nominal wage rigidity may
stop companies from adjusting to negative product demand shocks. The smaller the
wage cushion (the di￿erence between the wage actually paid and the wage agreed in
collective pay bargaining) the more di￿cult this manipulation will become. In addition,
the Portuguese labour market is also characterised by a widespread use of compulsive
extension mechanisms which expands an existing collective agreement to other workers
initially not covered by it or it can create a new one, if it is not viable to extend the
7
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additional di￿culty for ￿rms seeking to adjust their real wages.
Against this background, some features of the Portuguese labour market deemed to
be relevant for wage setting, such as the characteristics of the wage bargaining system,
the impact of minimum wages on employment, the determinants of the wage cushion
(the di￿erence between the actual wage and the bargained wage), the consequences for
wages stemming from ￿rm closures or the treat of unemployment, and the cyclical be-
haviour of real wages are investigated. It is worth mentioning that among the external
factors conditioning wage movements, the economic cycle plays a decisive role. Leaving
aside compositional e￿ects, real wages for Portuguese workers are highly pro-cyclical,
especially for starting wages (Carneiro et al. (2009))
Finally, the paper focuses on the dynamics of aggregate wages and prices. In the real
world, the existence of price and wage rigidities is expected to translate into persistent
responses of real wages, as well as of price and wage in￿ation to the shocks hitting the
economy. Thus, this section reports the evidence on persistence of the responses of
wages and prices to di￿erent types of shocks by comparing the evidence for Portugal
with similar evidence for the euro area (EA) and the United States (US).
The last section of the paper summarises and discusses the main conclusions con-
cerning the processes of wage and price formation in the Portuguese economy.
2 Micro evidence on price and wage rigidities
This section summarises the evidence recently obtained for Portugal on price and wage
setting at the micro level. We consider studies with micro data on consumer and
producer prices, as well as information on price and wage setting based on survey data.
The evidence presented in this section is based mainly on two datasets. The ￿rst of
these sources is the individual price data underlying the o￿cial consumer (CPI) and
producer (PPI) price indices collected by the Portuguese Instituto Nacional de Estat￿s-
tica (INE). The CPI database covers the period from January 1992 to December 2001
and contains information on consumer prices at the outlet and product levels, whereas
the PPI database contains information on producer prices at the ￿rm and product
level covering the period from January 1995 to August 2002. These are longitudinal
datasets: ￿rms or outlets are followed over time on a monthly or quarterly basis. The
study of these data was pioneered by Dias et al. (2008). In order to ensure the com-
parability of the results for Portugal, the EA and the US, the micro CPI evidence
reported in this section was based on a narrowly de￿ned sample of 50 products, which
are considered to be approximately representative of the full CPI basket (see Dhyne
et al. (2006)).
The second dataset contains information obtained from a survey conducted by the
Banco de Portugal in 2008 in the context of its participation in the Wage Dynamics
Network (WDN) - a Eurosystem research network set up in 2006 aimed at studying
more in depth the features and sources of wage and labour cost dynamics in the EA
8
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selection can be found in Martins (2009).
2.1 Some stylised facts on price-setting in Portugal
This subsection describes the pattern of individual price adjustments in Portugal, sum-
marised in a number of stylised facts1. This evidence is compared to the extent possible
to the results obtained with survey data even though this should be made with some
caution as the nature of the latter information is very di￿erent from the micro quanti-
tative data.
Table 1
Monthly frequency of price changes and durations of price spells
Portugal EA US
Monthly frequency CPI 0.21 0.15 0.25
of price changes PPI 0.23 0.21 ￿
Duration of price spells CPI(1) 8.5 10.6 4.6
(in months) Survey(2) 10.3 9.6 8.3
Source: alvarez2006; bils2004; blinder1998;
Dhyne et al. (2006); druant2009; and Martins (2009).
(1) Median; (2)Unweighted average.
Fact 1 - Changes in consumer prices are rather infrequent. The monthly frequency
of price changes in Portugal is equal to 0.21, which means that about 1 out of 5 prices
is changed on average every month (Table 1). This ￿gure compares to 0.15 and 0.25 in
the EA and in the US, respectively2. These ￿gures translate into a median duration of
price spells of 8.5 months in Portugal, 10.6 months in the EA and 4.6 months in the US.
However, producer price data show that di￿erences in the frequency of producer price
changes between Portugal and the EA are much smaller (0.23 in Portugal compared
to 0.21 in the EA).
1The facts presented take the micro CPI evidence as the benchmark given that the results for PPI
for the EA are less representative as only six countries had that information available (see Gautier
et al. (2007)
2It is worth mentioning that despite the e￿ort made to produce comparable statistics, the ￿gures
presented in Dhyne et al. (2006) do not fully account for some national speci￿cities in the collection
of price reports. One of the remaining major cross-country di￿erences is related to the treatment of
sales. For some countries, national statistical institutes report sales prices while in other countries the
prices that are reported during the sales period are prices without rebates. Typically, price changes
will appear to be less frequent and smaller in countries where sales prices are not reported. Therefore,
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Monthly frequency of price changes by type of goods
CPI Unprocessed Processed Non-energy Energy Services
food food indus. goods goods
Portugal 0.55 0.25 0.14 0.16 0.14
EA 0.28 0.14 0.14 0.78 0.06
US 0.48 0.27 0.22 0.74 0.15
PPI Food Durable Non-durable Energy Intermediate
goods goods goods goods
Portugal 0.21 0.18 0.05 0.66 0.12
AE 0.27 0.10 0.11 0.72 0.22
Source: `lvarez et al. (2006); Dhyne et al. (2006); Bils and Klenow (2004)
and Gautier et al. (2007)
Fact 2 - The frequency of price adjustments is rather heterogeneous across products
and across sectors. CPI data show that price changes are very frequent for unprocessed
food, while they are relatively infrequent for non-energy industrial goods, services and
energy goods (Table 2). Unlike most of other EA countries, changes in energy prices in
Portugal at the consumer level emerge as relatively infrequent (16 percent of the items
change every month), but this is due to the fact that gasoline prices were administered
during the sample period. On the other hand, evidence based on PPI data reveals that
there is a substantial degree of heterogeneity in the frequency of price changes across in-
dustries, which can be classi￿ed in three broad classes. Price changes are very frequent
for energy products, relatively frequent for food and durable products and relatively
infrequent for intermediate and non-durable non-food products. Several factors may
drive this heterogeneity. One important factor found both in micro quantitative and
qualitative data is the variability of input costs (Altissimo et al. (2006)). In particular,
prices seem to change less frequently for products with a higher labour cost share and
for products with a smaller fraction of intermediate energy inputs. This suggests that
wage rigidity can be a cause for price stickiness. In addition, as shown in Dhyne et al.
(2006) larger competition seems to reduce price stickiness.
Fact 3 - There is no evidence of widespread downward price rigidity. Indeed, even
though positive price changes are more frequent than negative price changes, price
decreases are far from being uncommon. On average, 40 percent of the price changes
are price reductions, though in services this number stands at 20%. Results obtained
with survey data are a bit lower (32 percent) even though the share of price decreases
in services is virtually the same (Martins (2010))3.
3These results are based on the information obtained from a survey conducted by the Banco de
Portugal in 2004 in the context of its participation in the In￿ation Persistence Network (IPN) ￿ a
Eurosystem research network which, for three years from the beginning of 2003 to the end of 2005,
undertook a joint research on in￿ation persistence in the EA and in its member countries. The main
objective of that survey was to investigate the pricing behaviour of Portuguese ￿rms with a particular
10
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Price increases and price decreases: frequencies and magnitudes by type of good
Monthly Total Unprocessed Processed Non-energy Energy Services
frequencies food food indus. indus.
Increases 0.13 0.29 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.09
Decreases 0.08 0.26 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.08
Magnitudes Total Unprocessed Processed Non-energy Energy Services
food food indus. indus.
Increases 0.10 0.17 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.09
Decreases 0.11 0.17 0.07 0.14 0.03 0.09
Source: Dhyne et al. (2006).
Fact 4 - Price increases and price decreases have in general the same order of mag-
nitude but they are sizeable compared to the prevailing in￿ation rate during the sample
period. Although price increases are on average more frequent than price decreases,
which is quite natural in an economic environment of moderate in￿ation, this asymme-
try does not carry over to the magnitude of price changes. In the common sample of
50 products, the magnitude of consumer price decreases is on average actually slightly
larger than the magnitude of price increases (Table 3). This result is in line with ￿nd-
ings for the EA as a whole where the magnitude of price decreases is on average two
percentage points larger than that of price increases (10.0 versus 8.2 percent). With
regard to the sectoral dimension, it can be observed that price changes for unprocessed
food are not only very frequent (as illustrated in Table 2) but also very large in size,
even though price increases and decreases tend to o￿set each other.
Fact 5 ￿ Survey evidence points to the presence of asymmetries in the adjustment of
prices in response to cost versus demand shocks. Survey evidence provides information
not only on the relative importance of various factors driving price changes and whether
there are asymmetries in price reactions to di￿erent types of shocks but also on the
speed of those reactions. Regarding the former, cost shocks are more relevant in driving
prices upwards than downwards, while changes in market conditions (in demand and
competitors’ prices) matter more for price decreases. Martins (2010) provides evidence
that changes in the price of raw materials is the most important factor driving prices
both upwards and downwards, whereas changes in demand and the wages costs are
the second most important factors for, respectively, price decreases and price increases.
Concerning the speed of price responses, survey results do not show any evidence that
prices move faster upwards than downwards (Figure 1). However, ￿rms seem to respond
faster to positive cost and negative demand shocks (5.5 and 5.9 months on average,
respectively) than to negative cost and positive demand shocks (6.8 and 7.1 months
on average, respectively). These reactions tend to be faster in trade and slower in
non-￿nancial services.
emphasis on the sources and extent of price rigidities. Details on the sample and survey design as well
as a discussion of the main results can be found in Martins (2010).
11
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1225
July 2010Figure 1: Speed of price reaction to signi￿cant changes in costs and demand
(excluding ￿rms that follow time-dependent pricing rules strictly; unweighted results)




















2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0
Number of months
Positive demand shock
Figure 2: Price setting strategies: time vs state dependent price setting











Small firms Medium firms Large firms
P
e r c e n t a g e




Working Paper Series No 1225
July 2010Fact 6 - Survey evidence supports the existence of ￿rms with time and state depen-
dent pricing strategies. In contrast to the assumption made in many popular micro-
founded macroeconomic models of in￿ation dynamics that ￿rms only change their price
as a function of time and in a staggered fashion, survey results uncovered ample evi-
dence of state-dependence in price setting. In the presence of shocks, state dependent
pricing rules lead in principle to greater price ￿exibility. When asked directly, ￿rms
declaring that under normal circumstances they follow state-dependent rules account
for 52 percent of total employment in the sample, whereas those that declare that they
follow time-dependent pricing rules under normal circumstances but change to state
dependent rules in the event of speci￿c shocks represent 24 percent of total employment
in the sample (Figure 2). These results are consistent with the econometric evidence in
Dias et al. (2007) who, using quantitative micro data, ￿nd strong statistical evidence
of state-dependent behaviour by Portuguese ￿rms, with in￿ation and demand pressure
emerging as relevant determinants of the frequency of price changes. Survey results
also point to the presence of important di￿erences across sectors: in business services,
time-dependent rules have a clear dominance as opposed to construction, trade and
manufacturing where most ￿rms follow state-dependent rules.
2.2 Wage bargaining in Portugal: evidence from survey data
In this subsection, we describe some of the main institutional characteristics of the
wage bargaining process in Portugal. This characterisation is important to a better
understanding of the evidence presented in the remaining of the paper concerning ￿rms’
wage setting practices and more generally the operation of the labour market.
The Portuguese Constitution provides the juridical principles of collective bargain-
ing and grants unions the right to negotiate. The e￿ects of the agreements are formally
recognized and considered valid sources of labour law.
Concerning the bargaining mechanisms, a distinction should be made between the
conventional regime and the mandatory regime. Conventional bargaining results from
direct negotiation between employers’ and workers’ representatives. A mandatory
regime, on the other hand, does not result from direct bargaining between workers
and employers, being instead dictated by the Ministry of Labour. The Ministry can
extend an existing collective agreement to other workers initially not covered by it or
it can create a new one, if it is not viable to extend the application of an existing
document. A mandatory regime is applied when workers are not covered by unions,
when one of the parties involved refuses to negotiate or bargaining is obstructed in
any other way.4 Therefore, the impact of collective bargaining goes far beyond union
membership and the distinction between unionized and non-unionized workers or ￿rms
becomes unimportant.
4Beyond the existence of compulsive extension mechanisms, voluntary extensions are also possible,
when one economic partner (workers’ representative or employer) decides to subscribe to an agreement
which it had initially not signed.
13
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The law does not establish mechanisms of coordination between agreements reached in
di￿erent negotiations. However, preference is given to vertical over horizontal agree-
ments, and the principle of the most favourable condition to the worker generally
applies.
Since most collective agreements are industry-wide, covering companies with very
di￿erent sizes and economic conditions, their contents tend to be general, setting min-
imum working conditions, in particular the base monthly wage for each category of
workers, overtime pay and the normal duration of work. Underlying the bargaining
process there is a mandatory minimum monthly wage which sets the minimum ￿oor
for wage negotiations5.
The Portuguese system of industrial relations apparently presents features of a
centralized wage bargaining system6. Massive collective agreements, often covering
a whole industry, predominate in the economy, while ￿rm-level collective bargaining
covers a low proportion (close to 10 percent) of the workforce. Moreover, trade union
confederations, employers’ federations and the Government meet at the national level
each year to set a guideline for wage increases (the so-called social concertation). How-
ever, this guideline is not mandatory and merely guides the collective bargaining that
follows.
On the other side, the fragmented nature of the trade union structure, the frag-
mented employers’ associations and the multiplicity of bargaining units provides the
system with a certain degree of decentralization. Even though collective bargaining in
Portugal takes place at a sectoral level and most workers are covered by the bargain-
ing system due to the existence of mandatory extensions, the coordination between
bargaining units is rather limited. In fact, the right to negotiate is given upon every
employer or employers’ association and to every trade union (regardless of the number
of a￿liated members they represent), and the parties have the possibility of choosing
the level of negotiation - regional, occupational, industrial or national. This leads to
5Currently, there is a unique legal minimum wage that applies to all workers. Workers formally
classi￿ed as apprentices receive just 80% of the full rate. The minimum wage is updated annually by
the parliament, under government proposal. Decisions on the level of the minimum wage are taken
on a discretionary basis, usually taking into account past and predicted in￿ation and after consulting
the social partners.
6Caju et al. (2008) perform a cluster analysis and identify three groups of countries using informa-
tion collected following a questionnaire to national central banks. The ￿rst group (Austria, Denmark,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden) mainly consists of
countries with a broadly regulated system of wage bargaining. This group is characterized by the
existence of extension procedures and a high level of collective agreement coverage, a dominance of
sectoral wage bargaining and the general absence of coordination. The second group (Belgium, Cyprus,
Finland, Luxembourg, Slovenia and Spain) exhibits the same general wage setting characteristics as
the previous group, but, in addition, some form of indexation, intersectoral agreements and the role
of government are all more important. Finally, the third group (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Japan, Lithuania, Poland, the UK and the US) gathers the countries where the wage bargaining
system is largely deregulated.
14
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July 2010Figure 3: Share of ￿rms with wages set under sectoral collective wage agreements




















the existence of a di￿use and complex system of wage bargaining with negotiation
fragmented and agreements multiplied.
Wage setting institutions are usually seen as playing an important role in the de-
termination of the dynamics of wages and more generally for the operation of labour
markets. For instance, Druant et al. (2009) show that bargaining institutions are cor-
related with the frequency and timing of wage changes whereas Babeck￿ et al. (2008)
and Dickens et al. (2007) show that they are also an important determinant of the
degree of downward wage rigidity. In addition, they seem to in￿uence the reaction
of ￿rms in the aftermath of shocks, as shown in Bertola et al. (2008) or the extent
to which ￿rms use di￿erent margins of adjustment to reduce their wage bill, as docu-
mented in Babeck￿ et al. (2008). More generally, there is a vast literature about the
role of wage bargaining institutions in shaping labour market outcomes, wage levels,
wage dispersion and wage ￿exibility. Despite the importance assigned to the role of
wage bargaining institutions, their measurement is far from being easy and comparable
information at an international level is rather limited7. The survey conducted in 2008
uncovered information at the ￿rm level on several institutional features a￿ecting wage
setting in individual ￿rms, such as the degree of centralization, the coverage of wage
bargaining and the presence of indexation mechanisms.
According to these results, in about 60 percent of the ￿rms (52 percent of total
employment in the sample) wages are set in the context of sectoral collective wage
7The most comprehensive time series of quantitative information on union density, minimum wages,
and indices of union coverage, coordination and corporatism for a number of OECD countries is
available from the OECD (see for example Elmeskov et al. (1998))
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agreements, even though only 30 percent of these ￿rms participate directly in the wage
setting process (Figure 3). Furthermore, in 10 percent of the ￿rms wages are set in
the context of ￿rm-level agreements: in 7 per cent ￿rm-level and sectoral agreements
coexist, whereas in 3 per cent ￿rm-level agreements are exclusive. However, whatever
the wage ￿oor agreed upon for each category of workers at the collective bargaining
table (the bargained wage), ￿rms are free to pay higher wages, and they often deviate
from that benchmark, adjusting to ￿rm-speci￿c conditions (see Cardoso and Portugal
(2005)). To the di￿erence between the actual wage and the bargained wage we call
wage cushion8. Survey results con￿rm that a signi￿cant share of ￿rms pays wages above
the ones that were contracted (Figure 4). The share of ￿rms paying a wage cushion is
remarkably high in ￿nancial services and generally decreases with ￿rm size. Cardoso
and Portugal (2005) estimate that the e￿ective wages in 1999 exceed contracted wages
in amount that varies between 20 and 50 per cent. The ￿gure obtained in the survey is
25 per cent. From the point of view of the ￿rms, the way this cushion is handled makes
it a strategic bu￿er against adverse shocks, in particular in a context where downward
nominal wage rigidity turns out to be an active constraint.
8This is distinct from the notion of wage drift, which is usually employed for diferences in wage
variations, rather than levels.
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As mentioned before, one important result from the analysis with micro data is that
those sectors with higher labour cost share tend to exhibit higher price rigidity which,
in turn, could re￿ect wage rigidity. This evidence is also supported by the survey
results (see Martins (2009)). In an attempt to complement these ￿ndings, this sub-
section presents additional evidence based on how ￿rms set and adjust their wages
and on the relationship between wage and pricing policies. In particular, based on
the information collected from the survey analysis, the aim is to provide answers to
the following questions: (i) What is the frequency of wage changes in Portugal? ii)
Are prices and wage changes synchronized or not; iii) Do they tend to take place
in speci￿c months of the year? iv) Are there signi￿cant di￿erences across ￿rms and
sectors regarding the frequency and timing of wage and price changes? The frequency
of wage changes was investigated through three separate questions: those due to factors
unrelated to tenure and/or in￿ation, those due to tenure and those due to in￿ation. A
synthetic variable for the frequency of wage changes for any of the three listed reasons
was also computed, de￿ned as the highest frequency of wage change at the ￿rm level
independently of the reason behind it910.
Table 4






Business services 11.4 13.2
Financial services 6.8 12.1
Very small ￿rms 9.6 14.6
Small ￿rms 10.0 14.3
Medium ￿rms 9.4 13.8
Large ￿rms 10.5 12.5
Memo:
EA 9.6 14.7
Source: Druant et al. (2009) and Martins (2009).
Results weighted by employment.
Table 4 shows that ￿nancial services, construction and trade tend to have shorter price
spells that those of manufacturing and business services. However, it should be noted
9In order to make comparisons easier, frequencies of price and wage changes were converted into
average durations of price and wage spells by simple multiplying each category (de￿ned in terms
of months) by its relative frequency. For those categories expressed in terms of time intervals the
mid-point was assumed.
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(as a share of all surveyed ￿rms with valid responses; unweighted results)
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typical months
37% of firms change wages in 
typical months
Source: Martins (2009a).
that when interpreting the results concerning ￿nancial services, a note of caution has
to be made not only because the concept of price might be di￿cult to capture, but
also because the interviews were carried out in a period of exceptional turbulence in
international ￿nancial markets11. As regards wages, there is little variation across
sectors: wage spells tend to vary between 12 and 14 months, with business services
and construction being the sectors where wages seem to be more rigid. Moreover, the
average wage spell in Portugal is two months shorter than the average wage spell in
the EA. All in all, most of the ￿rms (85 percent) change their wages only annually
(the corresponding ￿gure for prices is 67 percent). Druant et al. (2009) show that
cross-country variation is substantial in the case of wage changes but almost irrelevant
in terms of price changes while, in contrast, cross-sector variation is signi￿cant in terms
of price changes but little relevant in terms of wage changes.
Besides the frequency of adjustments, the degree of price and wage synchronisation
is another factor a￿ecting the degree of ￿rms’ ￿exibility to changes in their economic
environment. With a view to obtain empirical evidence on this issue, ￿rms were asked
to specify whether their price and wage changes take place with no prede￿ned time
pattern or are concentrated in particular month(s). As far as prices are concerned, this
latter option was chosen by about 37 percent of the ￿rms (Figure 5), which is somewhat
lower than the share of ￿rms following time-dependent pricing strategies under normal
circumstances (i.e. in the absence of special events) reported before (48 percent).
11The questionnaire sent to the banking institutions contained some changes compared to the main
questionnaire. In particular, in the price-setting section ￿rms were asked to take as their reference
price the interest rate applied to the main credit product assuming a medium-risk customer.
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a considerable degree of synchronisation among ￿rms, as about 65 percent of those
reporting the presence of some time regularity change their prices (not necessarily only
but also) in January. However, the degree of concentration of wage changes is much
higher than that of price changes as 81 percent of ￿rms seem to change their wages
in particular month(s), with January being the month with the highest frequency.
The large concentration of wage changes may re￿ect institutional arrangements at the
sectoral or ￿rm levels, in the form of collective bargaining agreements. Finally, another
important issue to investigate is the relationship between price and wage changes,
i.e. whether ￿rms’ wage and price adjustments are related and the extent to which
in￿ation feeds into wage adjustments. In order to assess the existence and direction
of a link between wage and price changes, ￿rms were asked about the link between
the timing of price changes and the timing of wage changes. The intensity, as well as
the direction of the relationship between the two strategies is summarized in Figure 6.
Results point to the presence of some synchronisation between price and wage changes
at the ￿rm level as around 50 percent of ￿rms, when asked directly, acknowledge the
existence of some relationship between the timing of price and wage revisions within
their company. However, only 20 percent state that this relationship is quite strong:
decisions are taken simultaneously for 7 percent of the ￿rms, prices follow wages in 9
percent of the cases and wages follow prices in the remaining 4 percent. In contrast,
for about 50 percent of the ￿rms, no link exists between the timing of price and wage
changes. This ￿gure is particularly high in ￿nancial services and trade. However, it
is worth mentioning that the lack of synchronization in many ￿rms in terms of price
and wages changes does not necessarily mean that the general in￿ationary outlook is
disregarded in wage setting decisions. One important source of information available
from the survey on how in￿ation developments may a￿ect ￿rms’ wage decisions is the
frequency of wage adjustments due to in￿ation. Figure 7 shows that in￿ation indeed
stands out as the most important factor triggering frequent wage adjustment (at an
annual or infra-annual frequency).
2.4 What could drive price and wage rigidities
Whereas the preceding subsections have analysed the stylised facts of price and wage
setting, this subsection focuses on the potential reasons why prices and wages are
sluggish. The most direct evidence on this issue can be obtained from the survey
information.
The survey conducted in 2004 on ￿rms’ price setting (see footnote 3) contained a
question which directly addressed the reasons for price stickiness: If there are reasons
for changing the price of your main product, which of the following factors may well
prevent an immediate price adjustment? The list following this question o￿ered a
series of statements, expressed in simple terms, based on di￿erent economic theories
of price rigidities. The respondents could indicate their degree of agreement with each
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Figure 7: Frequency of wage changes
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important (3) and very important (4), where the numbers in brackets indicate the
scores attached to each category. Implicit and explicit contracts, cost-based pricing
and co-ordination failure are the most relevant explanations for sticky prices, while
menu costs, pricing thresholds and costly information are not recognised as important
by the respondents (Table 5). The theory of implicit contracts, which emerges as the
most important explanation for sticky prices, is based on the idea that ￿rms establish
long-run relationships with customers in order to make future sales more predictable;
in other words, they try to win customer loyalty simply by changing prices as little as
possible. Co-ordination failure as an explanation for sticky prices is the second most
important factor, with an average score of 2.8. The idea is that ￿rms prefer not to
change their prices unless one of their competitors moves ￿rst. Cost-based pricing,
which assumes that prices do not change if costs do not change, and explicit contracts
(￿rms have to re-negotiate their contracts to change their prices) are third and fourth
in the ranking of explanations, with an average score of 2.7 and 2.6, respectively.
Table 5
What explains price stickiness?
Most important factors Less important factors
Factors Average Factors Average
score score
Implicit contracts 3.14 Judging quality by price 2.28
Coordination failures 2.84 Menu costs 1.89
Cost-based pricing 2.70 Pricing thresholds 1.78
Explicit (formal) contracts 2.63 Information costs 1.70
Source: Martins (2009).
Inspired by the analysis made for prices in 2004, the survey conducted in 2008
contained a question which tried to obtain information about the main reasons that
may prevent ￿rms from cutting or freezing their wages in a context where they need to
reduce labour costs. The list following this question o￿ered a series of possible reasons,
expressed in simple terms, based on di￿erent economic theories of wage rigidities.
Once again, respondents could indicate their degree of agreement with each statement,
choosing among four categories: unimportant (1), of minor importance (2), important
(3) and very important (4).
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What could prevent ￿rms from cutting or freezing wages?
Reasons Average Reasons Average
score score
Wage agreements Impact on ￿rm’s
and legislation(1) 3.58 reputation 2.93
Impact on workers’ Wages could become
motivation 3.44 non competitive 2.92
Impact on workers’ Di￿culties in attracting
performance 3.39 workers in the future 2.83
Impact from unpredictable Hiring and training
changes in wages 3.37 costs of new workers 2.73
Risk of losing the
best workers 3.29
Source: Martins (2009); Results weighted by employment.
(1)This is only applicable to wage cuts.
Table 6 shows that legislation stands as the most important factor preventing ￿rms
from cutting their wages. However, internal factors such as the impact on workers’
motivation and performance also play an important role as obstacles to wage cuts
or freezes. This result is in line with the evidence in other empirical studies (see
for instance Blinder and Choi (1990) or Franz and Pfei￿er (2006)). Martins (2009)
shows that a very small share of the ￿rms included in the survey report that, in
the absence of legal or contractual constraints, they would consider the possibility of
cutting their workers’ base wages in 2006 (the reference year of the survey). These ￿rms
account for 1.6 percent of total employment in the sample. In addition, those ￿rms
that would consider the possibility of increasing their base wages in 2006 below the
in￿ation rate in the absence of legal or contractual constraints account for 4.4 percent
of total employment in the sample.
3 Wage Formation
The debate about the Portuguese economy frequently ignores the essential fact that
the formation of wages plays a fundamental role in determining unemployment. The
few studies available on the estimation of labour demand function point to high wage
elasticities of labour demand (Varejªo and Portugal (2007b)). Here, we report inves-
tigations on how exogenous changes in minimum wages impact on worker ￿ows and
how exogenous wage ￿uctuations a￿ect ￿rm closures and, thus, worker displacement.
In a labour market with Portugal’s level of sclerosis, where the likelihood of ￿nding a
suitable job is very low, being unemployed is an extremely dramatic event (Blanchard
and Portugal (2001)). Hence, painful unemployment decreases the bargaining power
of workers. This link from unemployment rates to wages is also very relevant and
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this section, the cyclicality of real wages will also be discussed below in a novel way,
one which isolates the compositional bias arriving from (permanent) worker and ￿rm
heterogeneity.
3.1 The Conspicuous Nature of the Portuguese Labour Market
The Portuguese labour market is disfunctional, with very weak ￿ows between employ-
ment and unemployment. The explanation given by Blanchard and Portugal (2001)
for this conspicuous characteristic labour mobility is that it stems from the strong pro-
tection of employment embedded in Portuguese labour legislation, above all in terms
of the legal framework for ￿rings. Fundamentally, very long unemployment spells ￿ a
painful way of experiencing unemployment ￿ are the counterpart of job protection.
There is abundant empirical evidence that there is a greater prevalence of long
unemployment spells in countries with greater job protection (Blanchard and Portugal
(2001)). Fundamentally, the high costs of ￿rings increase production costs, bringing
down feasible wages (the wage that guarantees zero pro￿ts). Job protection in turn
increases workers’ bargaining power, and this means higher bargaining wage (the wage
to which the worker aspires). In this model, the equilibrium is re-established by making
unemployment more painful, that is, by reducing the arrival rate of job o￿ers. This
brings down the transition rate from unemployment to employment, and increases the
expected duration of unemployment12.
There is direct and indirect evidence on the job arrivals rate in the European House-
hold Panel, where Portugal has the lowest arrival rate of job o￿ers among all the
countries represented on the panel (Jolivet et al. (2006)). Franco and Torrres (2008)
calculated the probability of a worker leaving a job and ￿nding a new one, using data
from the Employment Survey13. They concluded that those probabilities are very low,
and show that job separations are almost acyclical and that the ￿nding probabilities
are strongly cyclical. In the work of Varejªo and Portugal (2007a) there is documented
evidence that only 25% of establishments change the composition of their work force.
Ejarque and Portugal (2007) solve a dynamic model of labour demand, using rele-
vant sample moments of the Portuguese labour market, to show that the presence of
adjustment costs can lead to a signi￿cant reduction in the ￿ow of jobs.
3.2 The Impact of Minimum Wages on Employment
Changes in the legislation e￿ective in 1987 in Portugal provide remarkably good con-
ditions for analysis of the employment e￿ects of mandatory minimum wages, as the
12In this setting, unemployment protection will tend to cushion the penalty associated with the
joblessness experience, and generate an ever steeper fall in the transition from unemployment to
employment.
13Elsby et al. (2008) o￿er a revealing international comparison based upon the computation of job
￿nding and job separating probabilities from suitable Employment surveys.
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matched employer-employee panel data set from Quadros de Pessoal, Portugal and Car-
doso (2006) modeled gross worker ￿ows ￿accessions and separations ￿in continuing
￿rms, as well as in new ￿rms and those going out of business, using a count regression
model applied to proportions. Employment trends for teenagers, the a￿ected group, are
contrasted to those of older workers, before and after the raise in the youth minimum
wage. Decomposition of the changes in employment by its sources can help reconcile
some of the evidence that has previously been presented in the literature as contradic-
tory, helping to disentangle the minimum wage puzzle. The results provided in Table 7
show that the share of teenagers among newly hired workers, both in continuing ￿rms
and in new ￿rms, decreased, following the increase in the youth minimum wage. These
￿ows would thus point towards the reduction of the relative demand for teenagers. On
the other hand, the share of teenagers in job separations in continuing ￿rms decreased
sharply following the rise in their minimum wage.
Table 7
Employment E￿ects of Increasing the Youth Minimum Wage
Poisson Regression with random e￿ects
Dependent variable: Share of employed teenagers
Coe￿cient Standard
error
Hires by continuing ￿rms
(n=99 608 ￿rms)
year 1988 -0.036 0.010
year 1989 -0.043 0.010
Separations by continuing ￿rms
(n=125 397)
year 1988 -0.150 0.010
year 1989 -0.140 0.010
Hires by new ￿rms
(n=38 138)
year 1988 -0.042 0.018
year 1989 -0.041 0.018
Separations by closing ￿rms
(n=19 203)
year 1988 0.050 0.023
year 1989 0.025 0.023
Note: Firm size, market concentration and a set of industry
dummies were also included.
From a worker perspective, the authors found that teenagers subject to a high wage
increase resulting from the change in the minimum wage are more prone to keep their
job than comparable groups of workers. This result points to the relevance of supply
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their minimum wage, reducing the high job turnover that is characteristic of low-wage
workers. In synthesis, in Portugal, the main short-term impact of the 1987 minimum
wage change was the reduction of separations from the employer, which compensated
for the reduction of job accessions. It should be noticed, however, that these results
re￿ect solely the short-run response to a minimum wage hike. In competitive labour
markets, long-run employment e￿ects are likely to be negative. Cardoso (2009) inves-
tigates long-run wage e￿ects and shows tenure-wage pro￿les are ￿atter for individuals
that bene￿t from the minimum wage increase.
3.3 The Wage Cushion
Which are the determinants of the contractual wages agreed upon with trade unions,
and how do these di￿er from the determinants of the actual wage that is paid? Do
collective bargaining outcomes re￿ect the bargaining power of the partners involved,
whereas wage cushion re￿ects market conditions? In the study of Portugal and Car-
doso (2006) the information contained in the Quadros de Pessoal dataset is explored
to analyse, at the microeconomic level, the wage bargaining process in the Portuguese
labour market. The regressions presented in Table 8 explore the impact of worker
attributes, ￿rm attributes and the collective bargaining system on bargained wages
and on the wage cushion. On the worker and employer side, the usual determinants of
wages have been considered: the worker gender, schooling, age and tenure; the ￿rm size,
age, average gross labour productivity and gross job ￿ow. Controls for the industry
and the region have been included in every regression. The variables that characterize
the institutional setting are less often found in the empirical literature. The degree
of coordination of employers in wage bargaining and the degree of trade union power
will deserve particular attention in the interpretation of the results. The degree of
coordination of employers results simply from the de￿nition of the types of collective
agreements existing in Portugal: single-￿rm agreement; multi-￿rm agreement, signed
by several employers, though not organized into a formal association; sector agree-
ment, signed between employers’ association(s) and trade union(s), often covering an
economic sector. Also, the government can impose a mandatory regime.
The degree of union bargaining power is captured by the concentration of bargaining
within an occupation, ￿rm or region. These proxies are based on the idea that, if the
labour force is more united in the bargaining process, it will have stronger bargaining
power. The Her￿ndhal index was used to evaluate the degree of concentration of
bargaining within an occupation, ￿rm or region. If one single collective agreement
covers the entire workforce in the occupation, the ￿rm or the region, the index reaches
the value one, interpreted as a high degree of union power within that occupation, ￿rm
or region. On the contrary, a fragmented bargaining process, with workers represented
by several trade unions bargaining separately, leads to a low value on the Her￿ndhal
index and suggests less union strength. We have estimated Tobit models on the wage
25
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1225
July 2010bargained, the wage cushion and, a result of the two previous forces, the actual wages
paid. This choice is justi￿ed by the fact that contract wages cannot fall below the
national minimum wage and actual wages cannot fall below the contract wage de￿ned
for the worker category.
Table 8
Determinants of bargained wages and the wage cushion
wage wage wage
bargained cushion actual
(coef.) (marg.) (coef.) (marg.) (coef.) (marg.)
gender -.109 -.062 -0.128 -0.79 -0.204 -.177
schooling 0.027 .016 0.030 .019 0.053 .047
age 0.034 .020 0.018 .011 0.038 .034
agesquared -0.0003 -.0002 -0.0002 -.0001 -0.0004 -.0003
tenure 0.007 .004 0.002 .001 0.007 .006
tenureless1y -0.033 -.019 -0.038 -.024 -0.058 -.051
￿rm.size(log) 0.048 .028 0.012 .008 0.041 .036
￿rm age -0.0004 -.0003 -0.0002 -.0001 -0.0005 -.0005
log.product. 0.044 0.026 0.033 .021 0.064 .057
￿rm gross job
￿ow rate 0.002 .001 0.012 .007 0.016 .014
ag.multi-￿rm 0.093 .058 -0.025 -.016 -0.017 -.015
ag.sectoral -0.036 -.022 -0.024 -.016 -0.145 -.132
ag. mandat.
regime -0.150 -.078 0.179 .127 -0.023 -.020
conc.ag.within
occup. 0.112 .065 -0.092 -.058 -0.025 -.022
conc.ag.within
￿rm 0.263 .153 -0.214 -.135 -0.013 -.011
conc.ag.within
region. -0.032 -.019 -0.063 -.040 -0.183 -.161
geog.scope -0.005 -.003 0.010 .006 0.002 .002
sizecol.agr(log) -0.035 -.021 0.008 .005 -0.008 -.007
Obs. 1134427 1134427 1134427
R2 0.54 0.30 0.59
It is interesting to note, ￿rst of all, that wage cushion reinforces the impact of worker
and ￿rm attributes on wages. Note that the signs of those coe￿cients are the same,
in the bargained wage and the wage cushion regressions. In other words, wage cushion
stretches the returns to education, gender, age, tenure, ￿rm size, ￿rm productivity
or ￿rm-level worker turnover (rate of job creation or destruction). On the contrary,
variables that capture the bargaining power of trade unions have a high impact on
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tration of bargaining within an occupation or within a ￿rm becomes less relevant in the
determination of actual wages than it was in the determination of bargained wages. In
other words, wage cushion shrinks the returns to union bargaining power. The previ-
ous results lend support to the hypothesis that wage cushion works as a mechanism to
overcome the constraints imposed by collective bargaining, allowing ￿rms wide scope
for action in their wage policy. The impact of the extent of union power deserves
further comment. Higher coordination on the side of the workers along occupation or
￿rm lines is associated with higher wages. If the degree of concentration of bargaining
within an occupation increases by ten percentage points, the bargained wage increases
by about 0.65 percent. Similarly, a more united labour force bargaining within the
￿rm raises bargained wages: an increase of ten percentage points in the degree of con-
centration of bargaining within a ￿rm raises bargained wages by 1.53 percent. These
results suggest that the fragmentation of bargaining reduces union capacity to extract
rents. However, as mentioned before, these returns on union bargaining power are
o￿set by ￿rm-speci￿c wage arrangements, in the form of wage cushion. In the end, the
concentration of bargaining within the occupation or the ￿rm has a very low impact
on the actual wages paid. On the employer side, higher coordination when bargaining
over wages is associated with lower wages. Single-￿rm or multi-￿rm agreements yield
higher bargained wages than sector-level agreements. Even though the rank of the type
of agreement changes after wage cushion operates, it is still the case that single-￿rm
and multi-￿rm agreements yield higher wages than sector agreements. The positive
impact of the ￿rm’s gross job creation rate and its average labour productivity on the
bargained wage is consistent with the results by Christo￿des and Oswald (1992) who
analyzed the impact of industry and regional variables on wages bargained in a sample
of labour contracts in Canada and found evidence that wage determination is a rent-
sharing mechanism. Their work found that higher pro￿ts in the industry enable unions
to extract a higher rent in the form of higher bargained wages, whereas a depressed
labour market, with a higher regional unemployment rate, decreases bargained wages.
3.4 Insider Power and Insider Forces
A considerable branch of the literature focuses on the internal factors of the company
in setting wages. Again we must consider the situation of monopolistic competition
which allows for the generation of rents that will be shared between owners and workers,
modi￿ed by the negotiating power of the two sides. In this theoretical framework, it
makes sense to tie wages to company performance indicators (pro￿ts, productivity, cash
￿ow, etc). Once the distinction between insider and outsider factors in a company is
established, there is scope for an interesting analysis of the distinction between insider
and outsider workers. The idea is that wages are fundamentally set by incumbent
workers (insiders) while those not on contract (outsiders) have a relatively minor role
to play. There are costs associated with selection, recruitment and training of insiders,
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rent associated with replacement costs guarantees insider bargaining power in wage
negotiations. The insider-outsider theory of wage setting allows us to put forward an
explanation for setting wages above the market equilibrium level. Wage insensitivity
to labour market conditions, and above all unemployment, can entail hysteresis caused
by the power of insiders. In this case, contemporary unemployment depends on past
unemployment, leading to a negative relation between contemporary wage levels and
past employment levels.
Table 9: Measuring Insider Power and Insider Forces
SYS-GMM Estimates of Wage Equation (1994-99)






Growth permanent employment -0.096
(-5.8)








Regional unemployment rate -0.123
(-5.9)
Notes:
Education, quali￿cation, and time dummies were also included.
t-statistics in parenthesis
In this section, we summarize the study by Carneiro and Portugal (2008a) who
employed longitudinal data from large ￿rms collected in the Balan￿o Social dataset,
to analyse the role of insider and outsider forces in the process of wage formation. The
main results are exhibited in Table 9. The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
results report a value of the insider weight of 18%, estimated with precision. The
long-run value of the insider weight is calculated by dividing the nominal productivity
coe￿cient (the short-run coe￿cient) by one minus the coe￿cient on the lagged wages.
This value is considerably higher than those obtained for other European Countries
such as Spain and the U.K. using ￿rm-level data. In fact, the short-run e￿ect of nominal
productivity on wages is strong and signi￿cant, suggesting that in Portugal wages are
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predictions of the insider-outsider theory that the greater the hiring and ￿ring costs,
the more the insider wage will depend on the ￿inside factors￿ relative to the ￿outside
factors￿.
Other evidence is revealed by the results. First, market share exerts a positive and
signi￿cant impact on wages, suggesting that monopoly power generates monopoly rents
that are captured by the employees in the form of higher wages. Second, with respect to
the dismissal threat variables, we obtain the expected signs for the coe￿cients on both
the labour utilization rate and on the layo￿ rate. Hence, workers in ￿rms with higher
labour utilization rates have higher insider power and, thus, earn more. An increase
in the layo￿ rate decreases signi￿cantly wages, in the short-run. This ￿nding seems to
suggest that when the employment perspectives of employed workers worsen, they tend
to restrain wage demands. Another interpretation is possible if the layo￿ rate is viewed
as a proxy for labour adjustment costs. In ￿rms with high (low) adjustment costs the
risk of being ￿red is lower (higher) and thus insider workers are in a better position to
extract rents in the form of higher wages. In fact, besides the high dismissal costs that
Portuguese employers have to bear, conditions in which a termination of contract is
admissible are also regulated quite strictly. These factors appear to work together to
strengthen the bargaining position of incumbent workers and their power to claim for
higher wages. Third, the regional unemployment rate has a negative and signi￿cant
impact on wages. This result reveals that outsiders’ forces have an important role
in wage determination in the sense that they a￿ect the alternative options to the
bargaining parties. Finally, a small negative e￿ect of the proportion of temporary
employees on average wages was found, although not statistically di￿erent from zero.
On balance, the results presented in this subsection show that ￿rms where insider
workers have more labour market power tend to pay higher wages, ceteris paribus. In
particular, in ￿rms with low layo￿ rates and high rates of labour utilization within the
￿rm, workers seem to extract rents in the form of higher wages.
3.5 Wages and the Risk of Displacement
The extent of job destruction and, in particular, ￿rm closing and job loss due to sector
reallocation, has been a matter of great concern in recent years, with empirical research
on gross job ￿ows experiencing a tremendous growth in the past decade. The studies on
the decomposition of net employment ￿ows emphasize the importance of job creation
and job destruction through the entry and exit of ￿rms. In Portugal, annual job ￿ows
produced by both plant births and plant deaths account for almost half of total gross
employment ￿ows (Blanchard and Portugal (2001)). However, the literature on ￿ows
of jobs is mostly employment accounting, without any direct information about the
magnitude of the wage or output elasticities of employment changes through the births
and deaths of establishments, or growth or contraction in existing establishments. Few
studies have yet analyzed how that wage variation a￿ects the probability of displace-
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closings is remarkably sparse. Most of the empirical literature on plant closings has
been concentrated on the e￿ect of unions in the probability that a ￿rm (plant) shuts
down. Based on the theoretical framework of Hamermesh’s model, Carneiro and Por-
tugal (2008b), using panel data from Quadros de Pessoal for workers displaced between
1994 and 1996, estimate a simultaneous failure-wage model to show how wages adjust
to a negative demand shock that raises the risk of displacement through ￿rm closing
and to what extent a wage change a￿ects the exit likelihood. The role of a mandatory
minimum wage on the ￿rm’s exit decision was also analyzed.
Table 10: Failure Equation




Past sales growth -0.327 -0.049
(-31.1)
Firm size -0.242 -0.037
(-77.2)
Market share -1.436 -0.217
(-29.0)
Multi-plant ￿rm -0.066 -0.010
(-6.9)
Proportion of foreign -0.206 -0.031
capital (-11.4)
Sales per worker -0.055 -0.008
(-13.8)
Regional unemployment 0.055 0.008
rate (7.3)
Predicted monthly 0.063 0.010
reservation wage (3.2)
Probability of being a 0.192 0.029




Notes: A set of ￿rm age, industry, regional and time
dummies are included. t-ratios are in parentheses.
The parameter estimates of the simultaneous probit-tobit regression model of ￿rm
closing and wage formation are presented in Tables 10 (structural failure equation)
and 11 (structural wage equation). The estimation strategy consists of having, as
far as possible, a complete set of controls to examine whether a robust association
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Table 3.10 report results (coe￿cients estimates and marginal e￿ects, respectively) for a
speci￿cation in which the probability of ￿rm closing depends on an extensive set of ￿rm
characteristics, the regional unemployment rate, monthly reservation wage (predicted)
and the estimated probability of being a minimum wage earner. A set of dummy
variables for industries, regions and years are also included. Past sales growth, ￿rm
size, age, market share, multi-plant ￿rm, proportion of foreign capital and sales per
worker are signi￿cantly correlated with the probability of ￿rm closing. In particular,
the results reveal that ￿rms experiencing a decline in sales growth are clearly more likely
to close. This seems to imply that sales contraction can be used as a strong predictor of
￿rm failure. Indeed, the fact that a ￿rm has grown in the past signals that it has been
performing well. Moreover, the estimates reported in Table 3.10 show that small ￿rms
are clearly more likely to close than large ￿rms. This result is conventional enough and,
in particular, is in line with the one obtained for Portugal in the study of Mata et al.
(1995) using a sample of newly born manufacturing plants. The variable market share
has a strong negative e￿ect on the probability of closing, suggesting that monopoly
power generates rents that may function as a bu￿er that cushions against negative
shocks. Workers that are part of a multi-plant ￿rm are less likely to be displaced due
to ￿rm closing than workers that are part of a single-plant ￿rm. The same is true
for workers that are part of ￿rms with a large proportion of foreign-owned capital.
Sales per worker, a proxy for productivity, have a negative impact on the probability
of ￿rm closing. Thus, low productivity ￿rms, all else being equal, are more likely to
close down. The coe￿cient estimate of the regional unemployment rate is positive
and statistically signi￿cant, suggesting that local economic conditions may a￿ect the
viability of some types of ￿rms. High-wage paying ￿rms face higher hazard rates than
low-paying ￿rms. After controlling for an extensive set of employers’ characteristics
and for local labour market conditions, the results reveal that ￿rms that pay higher
entry-level wages, holding revenue per employee ￿xed, are less likely to survive. A 1
percent wage increase is associated with a 0.16 percent increase in the probability of
job displacement through ￿rm closing. Finally, the two-step probit results report a
positive and signi￿cant e￿ect of the probability of receiving the minimum wage on the
failure rate, suggesting that ￿rms with a higher incidence of minimum wage workers
face higher exit rates than those with a smaller incidence. A 10 percent increase in the
proportion of minimum wage earners increases the probability of displacement through
￿rm closing by 0.6 percent. In fact, the possibility of wage concessions is precluded
if workers are paid legal minimum wages. Thus, ￿rms with a higher proportion of
minimum wage earners may have lower chances of survival due to their inability to
adjust wages downward in the face of a negative demand shock.
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Two-step Tobit Results (N=266,024 workers)













Tenure/100 squared -0.093 -0.088
(43.9)
Regional unemployment -0.058 -0.056
Rate (-25.1)




Notes: A set of ￿rm age, industry, regional and time
dummies are included. t-ratios are in parentheses.
Table 3.11 reports the two-step tobit results of the wage equation. The basic speci￿ca-
tion includes a set of controls for workers’ characteristics, the regional unemployment
rate and the instrumented probability of displacement due to ￿rm closing. A set of
industry, regional and time dummies are also included in the speci￿cation. All the
exogenous variables (excluding tenure squared) are statistically signi￿cant at the 1
percent level of signi￿cance and have the expected signs. The e￿ect of the probability
of closing on monthly wages is negative and also statistically signi￿cant. This implies
that a worker employed in a ￿rm that will close earns less in the year prior to displace-
ment than a similar worker employed in a non-closing ￿rm. Workers in a ￿rm that has
the average probability of failure in the population (6.3 percent), earn (one year prior
to closing) 5.6 percent less than workers in a ￿rm with zero probability of failure (a
useful arti￿cial benchmark). This empirical result indicates that average wages grow
less rapidly in ￿rms that will soon close, suggesting that ￿rms’ adjustment to negative
shocks are partially absorbed into wages.
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Do displaced workers in Portugal su￿er pre- and post-displacement wage losses? If so,
what are the magnitude and persistence of these losses? What are the main sources
of earnings losses? The main goal of the study by Carneiro and Portugal (2006) is to
analyze the costs of worker displacement in terms of earnings losses in the Portuguese
labour market. Two main objectives drive their investigation. The ￿rst objective is to
analyze the long-term impact of a displacement on the earnings evolution of displaced
workers in Portugal. The possibility to link workers with their employers constitutes
a tremendous advantage of the Quadros de Pessoal data set, reinforced by the fact
that recent empirical work on wage determination has been showing that employers’
characteristics are an important determinant of workers’ wages. The second objective
is to decompose the earnings losses according to their sources/causes.
Wage loss equations, estimated from a comparison between displaced and non-
displaced workers in the Quadros de Pessoal dataset are given in Tables 12 and 13.
The ￿rst column in Tables 12 and 13 provides results for a parsimonious speci￿cation
in which average real hourly earnings depend on the displacement dummies and a set of
individual characteristics that do not change with the job, such as age (and its square)
and education. Education is de￿ned as the number of years of schooling completed.
Two dummy variables were added to the model. One that takes the value one if the
worker has a part-time job in the post-displacement period and the other that takes
the value one for displaced workers who left the ￿rm one or two years before closing -
the early-leavers (zero otherwise). A set of time dummies is also included in order to
account for aggregate shocks.
Men displaced in year zero earn, three years before separation, 12.6 percent less than
their non-displaced counterparts, conditional on age, education, and macroeconomic
conditions. In these same conditions women earn 8.7 percent less . This gap increases
for both male and female with the approximation of the displacement event. Two
years after the displacement year, Portuguese men earn 24.8 percent less than their
non-displaced counterparts, and women earn 19.2 percent less. Only in the latter years
does a slower recovery in earnings seems to emerge. In any event, three years after
displacement men’s earnings di￿erential has risen by around 12.8 percentage points
(p.p.) and women’s di￿erential by around 10.4 p.p., when compared to the earnings
di￿erential three years before displacement.
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Weighted least squares regressions: men (N=773 104)
Dependent variable: log of average real hourly earnings
(1) (2)
Variables Coe￿cient. t-ratio Coe￿cient. t-ratio
Disp¡3 -0.126 (-14.0) 0.011 (1.5)
Disp¡2 -0.151 (-17.7) -0.006 (-0.9)
Disp¡1 -0.193 (-22.9) -0.029 (-4.1)
Disp0 -0.203 (-10.8) -0.073 (-4.6)
Disp+1 -0.234 (-15.6) -0.087 (-7.0)
Disp+2 -0.248 (-17.8) -0.109 (-9.4)
Disp+3 -0.254 (-16.2) -0.114 (-8.7)
Disp+4 -0.252 (-12.6) -0.113 (-6.7)
Age 0.066 (195.3) 0.046 (161.8)
Age squareda -0.059 (-141.1) -0.042 (-120.1)
Education 0.103 (679.4) 0.069 (479.1)
Part-time job 0.101 (27.7) 0.091 (29.9)
Early-leaver -0.012 (-1.4) -0.025 (-3.4)
Size 0.063 (254.5)





a variables divided by 100.
All speci￿cations include a set of time dummies.
The coe￿cient estimates of the early-leaver dummy variable are negative but not statis-
tically di￿erent from zero. Di￿erences in earnings between displaced and similar non-
displaced workers may be explained by di￿erences in employer characteristics where
the individuals work (see column 2). The ￿rst variable is size, which is measured as
the natural log of total employment in the ￿rm. Sales per worker is de￿ned as the ratio
of annual real sales and total employment (in logs). Finally, eight industry (one-digit
level) and six regional dummies were added to the model.
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Weighted least squares regressions: women (n=501494)
Dependent variable: log of average real hourly earnings
(1) (2)
Variables Coe￿cient t-ratio Coe￿cient. t-ratio
Disp¡3 -0.087 (-9.7) 0.012 (1.7)
Disp¡2 -0.103 (-12.2) 0.004 (0.6)
Disp¡1 -0.130 (-15.8) -0.006 (-0.9)
Disp0 -0.151 (-7.5) -0.044 (-2.7)
Disp+1 -0.174 (-11.4) -0.056 (-4.5)
Disp+2 -0.192 (-13.5) -0.084 (-7.2)
Disp+3 -0.191 (-12.1) -0.089 (-6.9)
Disp+4 -0.185 (-9.4) -0.083 (-5.1)
Age 0.040 (108.2) 0.026 (85.8)
Age squareda -0.031 (-63.4) -0.020 (-50.2)
Education 0.102 (587.8) 0.069 (408.4)
Part-time job 0.144 (41.8) 0.108 (38.0)
Early-leaver -0.011 (-1.2) -0.026 (-3.5)
Size 0.059 (231.3)





a variable divided by 100.
All speci￿cations include a set of time dummies.
The e￿ects of size and sales per worker on average hourly earnings are positive and
highly signi￿cant. The results reveal that a large part of the relative annual earn-
ings di￿erential may be explained by di￿erences in employers observed characteristics.
Three years before separation the earnings gap between displaced workers and the ref-
erence group is almost negligible and not statistically di￿erent from zero (+1.1% for
men and +1.2% for women). Indeed, after controlling for ￿rms’ characteristics, it is
still possible to observe a very similar pattern on earnings evolution over the entire
period of analysis. A pre-displacement dip in earnings is observed, followed by a drop
in earnings in the displacement year . Not surprisingly, three years after displacement
the relative earnings di￿erential (the earning loss) has risen by around 12.5 p.p. for
men and 10.1 p.p. for women Overall, the results for the male sample reveal that the
increase (three years after displacement) in the earnings gap of 12.5 p.p. is mainly
due to the loss of tenure in the job and to joblessness. According to our calculations,
tenure accounts for around 40-46 percent to the deepening in the earnings gap and
joblessness for around 33-43 percent. Changing industry explains only 14 to 24 percent
of the increase in the earnings gap. For female workers, the increase in the earnings
gap of 10.1 p.p. is mainly due to the loss of accumulated returns to tenure (45-52 per-
cent), joblessness accounts for 16 to 34 percent of that increase and changing industry
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3.7 The Falling Cyclicality of Real Wages
The Portuguese Labour market was for decades conspicuous for its low and strongly
counter-cyclical rates of unemployment, with clear evidence of a very weak mobility in
the labour factor. Researchers pointed quite naturally to the ￿exibility of real wages
as the main reason for this. Throughout this period, convincing evidence was gathered
suggesting strong cyclical sensitivity of aggregate wages in the behaviour of the unem-
ployment rate (Luz and Pinheiro (1993), Gaspar and Luz (1997), Dias et al. (2004)
and Marques (2008)). One decade on from the change in the monetary regime, with
the emergence of the EA, in the presence of historically high rates of unemployment,
it is important to revisit the relationship between wages and the unemployment rate.
One important dimension of ￿exibility in wages is rooted in the way that real wages
react to changes in economic activity. Either adjustments to employment along the
aggregate labour demand curve will trigger a counter-cyclical reaction in real wages; or,
the intertemporal substitution of leisure for labour along the dynamic labour supply
curve will lead to real wages synchronized with the economic cycle (see also section
4). A description of the cyclical behaviour of wages may, however, be partly obscured
by changes in the composition of the labour force over the economic cycle. Indeed,
the use of aggregate wage indicators causes intractable confusion as to the e￿ect of
changes in wage dispersion, in the distribution of hours worked and in the composi-
tion of the workforce. There is an additional factor in the use of aggregate data, with
the implicit assumption that the relationship between real wages and the economic
cycle is common to all workers or groups of workers. In this context there is an array
of evidence on the bias introduced by the greater tendency to retain quali￿ed workers
during the recession (and recruit unskilled workers during periods of expansion). In the
absence of any control over this type of heterogeneity of workers, there is the illusion of
counter-cyclical behaviour in wages. In turn, the emergence of better-paid jobs during
the expansionist phase of the cycle will tend to create an arti￿cial impression that wage
behavior is adjusted to the economic cycle. The aim of this inquire is to reassess the
cyclical behaviour of real wages in Portugal, bearing in mind the heterogeneity of the
work force, of jobs and of pay practices. This endeavour requires access to longitudinal
data bases with an unusually rich content and the use of estimation techniques that
are speci￿cally suitable to cope with the presence of various types of heterogeneity
(Carneiro et al. (2009)). With this in mind, use was made of the individual records
in the Quadros de Pessoal from 1986 to 2005. This involved 23,234,558 workers/year
and 521,563 enterprises/year. The treatment of heterogeneity was complex. Firstly,
the sampling procedure involved separating the workers by type. Secondly, a distinc-
tion was established between workers joining and staying on at the enterprise. This
meant taking into account the sorting process emphasised in economic theory between
the behaviour of wages for newly-arrived workers and for the job stayers. Thirdly, the
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observed characteristics of individuals (speci￿cally age, schooling and quali￿cations).
Finally, the estimation technique used made it possible to isolate the e￿ect of features
of workers that were unknown but remained constant over time (such as motivation,
discipline, creativity or leadership) and those of the enterprise (such as technological
intensity, entrepreneurial skill, organisational structure, market position or product
specialisation). To this end, an algorithm was specially devised to ensure an accurate
solution to the estimation problem in a regression model with two types of ￿xed ef-
fects (Guimarªes and Portugal (2009)). The cyclical sensitivity of real wages can be
condensed into the reaction of wages to the unemployment rate. Table 14 exhibits the
semi-elasticities of real wages in relation to the unemployment rate, with control exer-
cised only on the observed heterogeneity. Given this, a one percentage point increase in
the unemployment rate will lead to a 2.19 percent fall in the real wages of male workers
who stay in the same enterprise in consecutive years (between 1986 and 1995). The
estimates presented in Table 14 show generic evidence of wage ￿exibility in the period
between 1986 and 1995, above all for recently recruited workers. There is, however,
a clear indication that the cyclical sensitivity of wages has fallen o￿ signi￿cantly over
the past decade.
Table 14
Sensitivity of real wages to the unemployment rate
OLS
Period 1986-1995 1996-2005
Stayers New hires Stayers New hires
Men -2.19 -2.81 -0.81 -2.11
Women -1.44 -2.68 -0.61 -2.10
Source: Quadros de Pessoal (1986-2005)
Table 15
Sensitivity of real wages to the unemployment rate
Worker ￿xed e￿ects
Period 1986-1995 1996-2005
Stayers New hires Stayers New hires
Men -1.91 -2.94 -1.22 -2.29
Women -1.35 -2.71 -1.12 -2.27
Source: Quadros de Pessoal (1986-2005)
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Sensitivity of real wages to the unemployment rate
Worker and ￿rm ￿xed e￿ects
Period 1986-1995 1996-2005
Stayers New hires Stayers New hires
Men -1.77 -2.67 -1.30 -2.44
Women -1.39 -2.51 -1.13 -2.25
Source: Quadros de Pessoal (1986-2005)
This development may, of course, stem from a change in the composition of em-
ployment, either from the modi￿cation of unemployment or from modi￿cation of wage
reaction when a homogeneous labour force is taken for the whole of the period under
consideration. If account is taken of the e￿ects associated with the persistent charac-
teristics of workers, it is possible to show that a signi￿cant part of the loss of cyclical
sensitivity in real wages is in fact associated to changes in the composition of em-
ployment (Table 15). There remains, however, a clear indication of the fall in cyclical
sensitivity of wages even when the ￿ndings are ￿ltered for the presence of individual
permanent heterogeneity.
A comparison between the two tables also shows that the dynamics of labour force
recomposition along the economic cycle led to pro-cyclical bias during the period from
1986 to 1995 (above all for men) and a counter-cyclical bias for 1996 to 2005. Curiously,
with inclusion of the worker e￿ects, the behaviour of men and women is very similar.
Nothing essential changes with the additional control for ￿rm constant heterogene-
ity (Table 16). Interestingly, the same happens when control of the heterogeneity of
workers is added to control of the heterogeneity of enterprises. This ￿nding seems to
indicate that the ￿xed component of job recomposition follows a cyclical path identical
to the one of the workforce recomposition component.
The indication of a fall in the cyclical sensitivity of wages may be associated to the
inadequate nature of the mechanisms for wage determination in low-in￿ation environ-
ments, in particular the severe downward nominal rigidity of wages and the widespread
use of extension mechanisms applied to collective agreements. In turn, the growing gen-
erosity of the unemployment bene￿t system, especially with respect to the potential
duration of the bene￿t, made unemployment less painful, favouring the emergence of
reservation wages less sensitive to the rise in unemployment rates. Under these circum-
stances, one may assist to higher unemployment rate increases in order to overcome
the macroeconomic imbalances in the Portuguese economy (Blanchard (2007)).
4 Aggregate wage and price dynamics
The existence of wage and price rigidities, as documented in section 2, is widely recog-
nised as a crucial issue for macroeconomics and notably for monetary policy. In the
real world, the existence of price and nominal wage rigidities is expected to trans-
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that evaluating the degree of persistence of such responses is an issue of paramount
importance.
In this section we investigate the wage and price dynamics in Portugal with a special
focus on the persistence of real wages, wage and price in￿ation, and compare the results
with similar evidence for the US and the EA.
More speci￿cally, in this section we will try to give an answer to the following ques-
tions: 1) how do wages and prices react to di￿erent shocks that may hit the Portuguese
economy? 2) how persistent are the responses of real wages, wage and price in￿ation
to those shocks and how they compare with similar evidence for the US and the EA?
and 3) how important were the di￿erent shocks in accounting for wages and prices
￿uctuations in the Portuguese economy in the 1995-2007 period?
The analysis draws on previous work for the Portuguese economy (see Marques
(2008)), the US and the EA (see Duarte and Marques (2009))14. The approach is
conducted within a structural error-correction model which allows comparing the per-
sistence of real wages, wage and price in￿ation across shocks for di￿erent economies.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. Sub-section 4.1 presents a simple
theoretical model of wages and prices, which will be used to identify the long-run
wage and price equations, as well as the permanent structural shocks. Sub-section
4.2 presents the econometric analysis with a special emphasis on the estimation and
identi￿cation of the long-run wage and price equations. Sub-section 4.3 focus on the
identi￿cation of the structural shocks and sub-section 4.4 on the dynamic response
of wages and prices to these shocks, including some measures of short and long-run
persistence. Sub-section 4.5 discusses the main sources of wages and prices ￿uctuations.
4.1 A macroeconomic model for wages and prices in an open
economy
This sub-section presents a simple model for the determination of wages and prices,
which will be used further below to identify the long-run wage and price equations, as
well as the permanent structural shocks. The model consists of a production function,
a wage setting equation, an equation describing price formation, an equation for the
unemployment rate and an equation for the import prices in domestic currency. The
equations contain a minimum of dynamics in order to simplify the discussion about
14The results for the US and the EA used here for comparison purposes are taken from Duarte and
Marques (2009), but the results for the Portuguese economy di￿er signi￿cantly from the ones presented
in Marques (2008). The di￿erences stem from three main sources: 1) The sample period was updated
to include data for 2007; ii) there was a major revision of the data on labour productivity which
implied important changes on the coe￿cients, as well as on some properties of the estimated model
and iii) a di￿erent assumption underlying the identi￿cation of some of the shocks was introduced in
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We assume that production in the economy may be described by a constant returns
to scale Cobb-Douglas function (with lower case letters denoting logs):
y ¡ e = ´ + (1 ¡ °)(k ¡ e) (1)
where y is output, e is employment, k is the stock of capital and ´ a stochastic tech-
nology variable. We may further simplify the production function and simply write:
h = y ¡ e = »h (2)
where h stands for labour productivity and »h for a stochastic technology trend (techni-
cal progress and capital accumulation) that shifts labour productivity in the long-run.
It is assumed that technology is exogenous and follows a stochastic random-walk pro-
cess, i.e., »h = »h¡1 + Áh where Áh is a pure technology innovation.
As regards the wage formation, we assume that wages are determined through a
bargaining process between ￿rms and employees (or the labour unions). This type of
models predicts that the bargaining solution will depend on the real producer wage
and productivity on the ￿rm side, and on the real consumer wage on the workers side.
A simple log-linear form of the wage equation corresponding to the bargaining solution
can be written as:
w ¡ q = k1 + ¹(p ¡ q) + ±h ¡ µu; 0 · ¹;± · 1;µ ¸ 0; (3)
where w is the nominal wage rate, q is the producer price level, p is the consumer price
level and u is the unemployment rate.
According to (3), the real wage faced by ￿rms (real producer wage) is a￿ected by
(p¡q), h and u. The relative price (p¡q), which measures the di￿erence between the
producer real wage and the consumer real wage, is usually referred to as the price wedge,
and plays an important role in theoretical wage bargaining models. Its coe￿cient, ¹,
can be interpreted as a measure of "real wage resistance", which measures the unions
ability to obtain higher wages to compensate for exogenous changes in workers’ living
standards (increases in p brought about, for example, by increases in indirect taxes).
The bargaining solution (3) also implies that an increase in labour productivity, h, will
increase wages, since higher productivity increases the pro￿tability of ￿rms, making
them more likely to accept higher wage claims from the unions. The unemployment
rate, u, represents the degree of tightness in the labour market, which in￿uences the
outcome of the bargaining process through the relative bargaining power of the labour
unions and employers organizations.
For the process of price formation we assume an economy with imperfect compe-
tition where producers target their prices, q, as a mark up, !, over marginal costs. If
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set as a mark-up over unit labour costs:
q = ! + (w ¡ h): (4)
The mark-up is not necessarily constant and, in an open-economy, it may be a function
of the level of international competitiveness. Here, we assume that the mark-up may
be written as:
! = k2 + ¸(z ¡ q); k2;¸ ¸ 0; (5)
where z is the domestic currency price of imports and ¸ re￿ects the exposure of domestic
￿rms to international competition. The smaller is ¸ the smaller is the pass-through
from foreign price or exchange rate shocks to domestic producer prices.
If we further assume that consumer prices are a weighted average of producer and
import prices:
p = (1 ¡ ½)q + ½z; 0 < ½ < 1; (6)
we may solve the model for wages and consumer prices obtaining the so-called long-run
wage and price equations (ignoring the constants for simplicity):
w = (1 + ®)p ¡ ®z + ±h ¡ µu + ¿w; (7)
p = ¯(w ¡ h) + (1 ¡ ¯)z + ¿p; (8)
where ® = ½(1 ¡ ¹)=(1 ¡ ½) and ¯ = (1 ¡ ½)=(1 + ¸). Under the assumption that
the two relations are stationary, the stochastic variables ¿w and ¿p can interpreted
as exogenous wage and price shocks that follow stationary stochastic processes, i.e.,
¿i = ¾i¿i¡1 + ²i with 0 · ¾i < 1 (i = w; p).
For the unemployment rate, we assume that it is the result of the di￿erence between
the labour supply and labour demand, so that in the long run unemployment may be
a￿ected both by real wages, (w ¡ p), and productivity, h:
u = ¼1(w ¡ p) + ¼2h + »u; (9)
where »u is an exogenous stochastic variable. Equation (9), being a reduced form equa-
tion, has the implication that »u is a combination of labour supply and demand shocks.
If equation (9) turns out to be a cointegrating relation, »u would be interpreted as a
stationary shock, while in the absence of cointegration, »u would be seen as stochastic
random-walk process, i.e., »u = »u¡1 + Áu where Áu is a pure unemployment shock.
Finally, we assume that import prices in domestic currency may depend on unem-
ployment, as well as on productivity:
z = °1u + °2h + »z (10)
This way we allow for the possibility of unemployment and productivity/technology
shocks to have long-run impacts on import prices through changes in the exchange
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cointegrating relationship. In the absence of cointegration, it will be assumed to follow
a random-walk process, i.e., »z = »z¡1 + Áz where Áz is a pure exogenous import price
shock.
Thus, our theoretical model expressed in terms of the variables we consider in the
empirical analysis (w;p;u;h;z) is composed of equations (2),(7),(8),(9) and (10).
4.2 Econometric Analysis
To estimate the model above for the Portuguese economy we use quarterly seasonally
adjusted data for wages (w), labour productivity (h), the unemployment rate (u) and
consumer (p) and import prices (z), for the period 1992q2 to 2007q4. Wages refer to
nominal compensation per employee for the whole economy, whereas labour productiv-
ity is measured as real GDP per employed person. Consumer prices are measured by
the consumer price index (CPI) and import prices, are measured by the total imports
de￿ator. For the analysis that follows we assume that w, p, h, z and u are all integrated
of order one, I(1). This assumption seems to be broadly supported by the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit-root tests (see Marques (2008)). According to the model
outlined in sub-section 4.1, we expect two stationary relationships or, in other words,
two cointegrating vectors, one corresponding to the wage equation and the other to
the price equation. Even though the model also allows for some endogeneity of un-
employment and import prices, we do not expect these two equations to give rise to
additional cointegration relations because the model does not include all the variables
we believe might help explain unemployment or import prices long-run behaviour. In
order to investigate whether this assumption is consistent with the data we start by
estimating a full-system unrestricted VAR model in the ￿ve variables w;p;u;h; and z
and test for the existence of cointegration17.
Based on the evidence from the cointegration tests for the model without the dummy
variables (see Table 17), the hypothesis of two cointegrating vectors emerges as the
natural choice that reconciles the empirical evidence with the theoretical features of
the model.
As the unrestricted cointegrating vectors are hardly given any economically mean-
ingful interpretation, we proceed by using information derived from the underlying
16The emergence of the EA in 1999, with the introduction of a single currency, implied a signi￿cant
change in the monetary policy regime at the country level, as the possibility of an independent
monetary policy was lost. As a consequence the reaction of the nominal exchange rate to some of
the shocks that hit the Portuguese economy during the sample period is likely to be di￿erent for the
periods before and after the emergence of the EA. In particular, this is the case of idiosyncratic shocks
(the ones that hit the Portuguese economy and not the EA as whole), which are not expected to bring
about signi￿cant changes in the nominal exchange rate in the period after the emergence of the EA.
17Since the data are trending the VAR includes an unrestricted constant. In addition, four dummy
variables (one step and three impulse dummies) are introduced to allow for special events (namely
VAT rate changes) occurred during the sample period.
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tionships. In our framework, the identi￿cation of the long-run wage and price equations
depends on the number of cointegrating vectors of the system. Under the assumption
of two cointegrating vectors, it can be shown that the order condition for identi￿ca-
tion of the wage and price equations (7) and (8) is met, but the rank condition does
not hold. In order to overcome this problem, we impose ® = 0 in equation (7) such
that z drops from the wage equation. In this case it is possible to show that the two
equations do meet the necessary and su￿cient condition for identi￿cation, so that the
system becomes over-identi￿ed with three over-identifying testable restrictions.
Table 17: Cointegration Trace Tests
Rank Corrected Corrected 90% 95% 99%
trace testa trace testb quantile quantile quantile
0 78.27*** 70.67** 64.74 68.68 76.37
1 48.42** 42.36 43.84 47.21 53.91
2 26.38 22.29 26.70 29.38 34.87
3 11.49 5.44 13.31 15.34 19.69
4 0.20 0.10 2.71 3.84 6.64
Note: *** and ** mark signi￿cance at 1% and 5% respectively;
(a) Small sample corrected trace test using the Reinsel-Ahn correction
(Cheung and Lai, 1993);
(b) Small sample corrected trace test using the Bartlett correction factors
(Johansen, 2002).
Once we estimate the model imposing these three over-identifying restrictions we
realise that the coe￿cient of productivity, ±, becomes close to one. If we further
impose this restriction we get the following two long-run relationships (with asymptotic
standard errors in parenthesis):





(w ¡ h) + 0:501
(0:049)
z (12)
where it is worth noticing that the wage equation is such that it implies cointegration
between unemployment and the wage share (or real unit labour cost, w¡p¡h), which
is a result often found in the empirical literature.
As regards the coe￿cient of the unemployment rate we note that the estimate
¡0:097, is in line with the standard elasticity estimates obtained in the literature for
other countries, which usually stand close to ¡0:10 (see, for instance, Blanch￿ower
and Oswald (1994)). The estimate for Portugal is signi￿cantly lower than the ones
obtained in Duarte and Marques (2009) for the US (¡0:327, for 1993q1-2007q4) and
the EA (¡0:157, for 1989q1-2007q4), but close to the estimate obtained in Carneiro
and Portugal (2008a), as shown in section 3.
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￿cients on unit labour costs (w ¡ h) and import prices z are basically similar. The
estimate for the coe￿cient on import prices (¡0:501) is signi￿cantly higher than the
corresponding estimates obtained in Duarte and Marques (2009) for the US (0:128)
and the EA (0:374).
4.3 Identi￿cation of the structural shocks
In a VAR model with I(1) variables it is known that cointegration imposes restrictions
on the matrix of the long-run e￿ects of the shocks to the system, which must be
taken into account for the identi￿cation of the structural innovations. Our system has
￿ve variables and two cointegrating vectors and this has the implication that there
must be three structural shocks with permanent e￿ects and two structural shocks with
transitory e￿ects. It can be shown that the identi￿cation of the three permanent shocks
may be achieved by imposing three restrictions on the long-run impact matrix and the
identi￿cation of the two transitory shocks may be obtained by imposing one restriction
on the matrix of the contemporaneous e￿ects18.
To discuss further the economic identi￿cation of the permanent shocks in the con-
text of our theoretical model, we may express the endogenous variables as a function
of the exogenous shocks. Ignoring the two transitory shocks, the general solution of












































where the ­ij are functions of the model parameters: ¯, °1, °2, ±, µ, ¼1, ¼2. From
equation (13) we see that an import price shock, »z, has a zero long-run impact on
unemployment and productivity and that an unemployment shock, »u, has a zero long-
run impact on productivity. On the other hand, productivity or technology shocks, »h,
may have a non-zero long-run impact on all the variables of the model. According to
the discussion above, these three zero restrictions allow the exact identi￿cation of the
three permanent shocks.
In terms of our theoretical model, the permanent import price shock is expected
to have an equal long-run impact on nominal wages and prices, thus leaving the real
wage unchanged in the long run and having no long-run impact on unemployment
18For further details on the econometric identi￿cation of the structural shocks, see Marques (2008)
and Duarte and Marques (2009) and the references therein.
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of imported goods or from an unexpected change in the nominal exchange rate. The
permanent unemployment shock is identi￿ed by the condition that it has a zero long-run
e￿ect on productivity and is interpreted as a shock that may stem from an unexpected
increase in labour supply or labour demand. The permanent productivity shock is
interpreted as a technology shock (technical progress and capital accumulation) and
is allowed to have permanent e￿ects on all the variables of the system. Notice that
this identi￿cation conforms to the restriction satis￿ed by a broad range of models,
where only technology shocks have a permanent e￿ect on labour productivity (see, for
instance, Gali (1999)).
Finally, to identify the two transitory shocks we impose the restriction on the matrix
of the contemporaneous impacts that the transitory price shock is not allowed to have
a contemporaneous e￿ect on wages. Thus, the transitory wage shock is the shock that
may have contemporaneous e￿ects on both wages and prices. The interpretation of
the transitory shocks is not as intuitive as that of the permanent shocks, as in the
context of our model they may stem from a variety of alternative sources with di￿erent
implications for the dynamics of the model. For this reason, the discussion below focus
mainly on the three permanent shocks.
4.4 Impulse responses
The impulse response functions of model variables, as well as the responses of real
wages, the labour share and wage and price in￿ation to the three permanent shocks
are depicted in Figures 4 to 619. Table 18 presents two measures of persistence for real
wages, wage and price in￿ation for Portugal, the US and the EA20. The two measures
of persistence are de￿ned as the proportion of the total disequilibrium that dissipates in
the two years after the shock, and the number of periods required for 99 percent of the
total disequilibrium to dissipate. We see the ￿rst measure as a simple way of quantifying
the speed of reaction in the short-term, so that we will loosely denote it as "short-term
persistence" and the second as a way to measure "long-run persistence". When the
speed of adjustment to the new equilibrium varies throughout the convergence period,
we will need to look at both measures to better characterize the adjustment process.
Figure 8 depicts the impulse responses to a permanent positive import price shock. As
expected, given the property of long-run nominal homogeneity of the estimated model,
an unexpected import price shock brings about a permanent increase in nominal wages
and prices of the same magnitude in the long run. As a result, real wages, as well as
the labour share remain unchanged in the long run.
19The impulse response functions for the ￿ve original variables of the system are depicted together
with 80 percent con￿dence bands.
20The ￿gures for the US and the EA are from Duarte and Marques (2009).
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¢w ¢p w ¡ p
PT US EA PT US EA PT US EA
Share of total disequilibrium dissipated after 8 quarters
Permanent shock
Imp. prices 0.62 0.80 0.42 0.70 0.80 0.55 0.42 0.28 0.60
Unemploy. 0.58 0.58 0.25 0.52 0.65 0.40 0.75 0.50 0.64
Productiv. 0.66 0.54 0.63 0.72 0.58 0.64 0.69 0.55 0.44
Transitory shock
Wage 0.82 0.90 0.87 0.74 0.83 0.59 0.72 0.73 0.72
Prices 0.54 0.57 0.48 0.81 0.85 0.75 0.72 0.34 0.51
Number of quarters required for 99 % of the total disequilibrium to dissipate
Permanent shock
Imp. prices 39 42 44 39 40 43 45 43 40
Unemploy. 40 41 48 43 37 47 35 35 41
Productiv. 39 39 42 39 35 42 35 41 47
Transitory shock
Wage 31 29 34 37 40 41 35 44 38
Prices 36 45 44 27 36 40 33 38 46
However, in the short run prices increase faster than nominal wages so that real wages
decrease during the ￿rst year or so, and the labour share decreases during the ￿rst three
years, after the shock. A noteworthy result is that the adjustment of real wages displays
a hump-shaped response type to this shock, before starting to return to the previous
equilibrium level21. While the largest impact on in￿ation occurs contemporaneously,
the largest impact on wage changes only occurs after one year.
From Table 18 we can see that after two years (8 quarters) only 42 percent, 62
percent and 70 percent of the total disequilibrium has dissipated for real wages, wage
in￿ation and price in￿ation, respectively. The larger short-term persistence of wages
following an import price shock comes hardly as a surprise. On the one hand, the
import price shock is expected to impact directly on prices and only indirectly on
wages. On the other hand, as we have seen in section 2, wages in Portugal are adjusted
once a year on average, while prices change more frequently, thus allowing a much
faster short-term response of consumer prices to an import price shock.
As regards long-run persistence, we conclude that real wages emerge as somewhat
more persistent in Portugal compared to the US and the EA, while wage and price
in￿ation emerge as somewhat less persistent than in those two economies.
Figure 9 displays the impulse responses to an unexpected permanent positive un-
employment shock. The shock seems to a￿ect mainly wages with no signi￿cant impact
on consumer prices in the long run. The explanation for this result may be found in
21Interestingly, the same pattern is displayed by real wages in the US and the EA, following an
import price shock. See Duarte and Marques (2009).
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(eventually following a currency depreciation induced by higher unemployment) and,
therefore, partly o￿sets the expected e￿ect of higher unemployment on prices through
lower wages22. As a result of the shock, real wages and the labour share decrease
permanently to a lower equilibrium level.
Two years after the shock 75 percent of the total disequilibrium in real wages has
already dissipated, which means that these are less persistent in face of an unemploy-
ment shock than in face of an import price shock. In the short-run, real wages also
emerge as somewhat less persistent in Portugal than in the US or in the EA (where
only 50 and 64 percent of the disequilibrium dissipates in the two ￿rst years after the
shock). This accords with the idea that in Portugal real wages react very quickly and
signi￿cantly to negative news coming from the labour market. Thus, if anything, real
wages emerge as adjusting very quickly to shocks to unemployment, suggesting that
wage ￿exibility, understood as the reaction of real wages to changes in unemployment,
is very high in the Portuguese labour market. In the long-run the speed of adjustment
of real wages in Portugal is similar to that of the US but faster than in the EA.
As regards wage and price in￿ation, both variables emerge as more persistent in
the EA than in Portugal or the US, regardless whether one looks at the short or the
long-term adjustment. The speed of adjustment of wage in￿ation is basically the same
in Portugal and the US, but signi￿cantly faster than in the EA. Price in￿ation is also
less persistent in Portugal than in the EA, but somewhat more persistent than in the
US.
Figure 10 depicts the impulse responses to a permanent positive technology shock
that shifts productivity in the long run and, by de￿nition, may impact on the long-run
level of all the variables of the model.
In the context of our estimated model all productivity gains are absorbed by nominal
wages in the long run (± = 1 in equation (7)). Thus, in the long run, under a ceteris
paribus assumption, we could expect nominal wages to increase in line with productivity
and the labour share to remain constant. However, in our model the productivity
shock causes a decline of import prices and of unemployment, which translate into an
additional increase in wages implying a permanent increase not only in real wages, but
also in the unit labour costs and the labour share23. Consumer prices are negatively
a￿ected, but not signi￿cantly so.
In line with the behaviour of nominal wages and consumer prices, an unexpected
positive shock in productivity has a temporary positive impact on wage in￿ation and
a negative impact on price in￿ation. In either case, the short-term response of wage
and price changes is rather fast given that after two years more than 60 percent of the
22This result should be interpreted very cautiously, as the emergence of the EA is likely to have
brought about signi￿cant changes in the reaction of the nominal exchange rate to unemployment
shocks. See also the comments to equation (10) above.
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July 2010disequilibrium has already dissipated.
As regards long-run persistence, real wages display the same persistence as in the
case of the permanent unemployment shock, but emerge as clearly less persistent than
in the case of the permanent import price shock. Wage and price in￿ation display the
same long-run persistence as in the case of the import price shock, but somewhat lower
than in the case of the permanent unemployment shock.
Compared to the US and the EA real wages appear as less persistent in Portugal
(it takes between 8 and 9 years in Portugal, compared to about 10 years in the US, and
almost 12 years in the EA, for the full adjustment to take place). Persistence of wage
and price in￿ation in Portugal is similar to that in US and somewhat smaller than in
the EA.
4.5 Sources of wage and prices ￿uctuations
We now investigate how important were the di￿erent shocks in accounting for the
observed ￿uctuations in wages and prices, by looking at the forecast-error variance
decompositions for the variables of the model. As expected, the two transitory wage
and price shocks explain a signi￿cant amount of the variation in the corresponding
variables forecast errors in the very short run (up to 2 or 3 quarters), whereas permanent
shocks play a more predominant role at longer horizons (see Table 19).
Table 19: Forecast error variance decomposition
at the business cycle frequencies(a)
Wages Prices
Shocks PT US EA PT US EA
Permanent import price shock 0.06 0.15 0.24 0.32 0.15 0.57
Permanent unemployment shock 0.33 0.41 0.40 0.11 0.17 0.26
Permanent productivity shock 0.59 0.31 0.12 0.54 0.63 0.10
Transitory wage shock 0.01 0.10 0.20 0.02 0.01 0.01
Transitory price shock 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.07
(a)Average contribution of each shock in the 12th, 16th and 20th quarter.
Permanent productivity shocks are the main driver of price and wage developments,
being responsible for approximately 60 percent of the variation of wages’ and 54
percent of the variation of prices’ forecast errors, at the business cycle horizons (3-5
years). Shocks to import prices are not important for wage developments but are very
important for price developments. For those periods, on average around 30 percent
of the variation in the forecast errors in prices is attributable to import price shocks.
Unemployment shocks play an important role in explaining wage ￿uctuations at the
business cycle horizon, accounting for 33 percent of the variation in wages’ forecast
errors, but a minor role in explaining price dynamics (only 11 percent of the variation
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July 2010Figure 11: Historical decompositions of 12 quarter ahead forecast errors in w and p
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for this minor role stems from the fact that the e￿ect on lower prices through lower
wages is partly o￿set by the e￿ect of higher import prices.
Figure 11 illustrates the roles played by the di￿erent shocks during the sample
period, by plotting the forecast-error at the three-year horizon (12 quarters) and the
portion attributable to each shock for wages and prices. Looking at speci￿c episodes,
we see that the forecast errors in wages are mainly attributable to permanent unem-
ployment shocks for most of the sample period, but productivity/technology shocks
emerge as playing an important role in the most recent years of the sample (from late
2006 onwards). As regards price developments, import price shocks emerge as very
important at the beginning of the sample (1995-1997) while productivity shocks seem
to play the prominent role afterwards. Finally, the comparison of the main sources of
wage and price ￿uctuations between Portugal, the US and the EA show that the results
for Portugal are closer to the ones for the US. Productivity/technology shocks are the
main driver of prices in Portugal and the US, while in the EA price developments are
mostly explained by import price shocks. Wage developments are mostly explained
by unemployment and productivity shocks in Portugal and the US, but in the EA
productivity shocks do not play a signi￿cant role (see Duarte and Marques (2009)).
5 Conclusions
This paper documents the main features of price and wage setting practices in the
Portuguese economy, investigates the salient features of wage formation, and evaluates
the consequences for the persistence of real wages, wage and price in￿ation stemming
from wage and price rigidities.
As regards ￿rms’ pricing behaviour the most noticeable ￿nding is that, in the Por-
tuguese economy, prices are somewhat less ￿exible than in the US but more ￿exible
than in the EA. The evidence from the distribution of price changes gathered from
micro data indicates that about 1 out of 5 prices is changed on average every month
and that the median duration of a price spell is about 8.5 months (10.6 months in the
EA and 4.6 months in the US). There is no evidence of general downward rigidity, as
price decreases are not uncommon. Reassuringly, the evidence on both producer and
consumer prices is quite similar.
Regarding ￿rms’ wage setting practices, we uncovered evidence favouring the hy-
pothesis of aggregate and idiosyncratic wage ￿exibility. Changes in wages occur with
less frequency than changes in prices though. If frequency is converted into duration, it
can be seen that the average duration of wages is 13 months ￿ 2.5 months longer than
the average duration of prices, but about 2 months less than in the EA. Most wages
are de￿ned with the behaviour of in￿ation borne in mind, above all expected in￿ation,
though the relationship is not a formal one.
Despite the rigidity imposed by the existence of mandatory minimum wages, the
presence of binding wage ￿oors determined by collective agreements, and the general
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ments via the mechanism of the wage cushion. The wage cushion can serve as a bu￿er
against the negative product demand shocks to provide ￿rms room to adjust to both
internal and external factors. In the Portuguese case, rent sharing between employers
and workers gives a relatively high importance to internal factors, in comparison with
other European countries. But wages also react strongly to local labour market con-
ditions. In a sclerotic labour market, where the loss of a job can be a dramatic event
because of the low arrival rate of job o￿ers, wages are conditioned by fears of dismissal
(among these the possibility of displacement due to ￿rm closure). The sensitivity of
real wages to the unemployment rate is fairly high in the Portuguese labour market.
The evidence provided by macroeconomic models con￿rms the indication that Por-
tuguese wages behave in a fashion consistent with the Wage Curve literature. In its
static interpretation, a 10 percent increase in the unemployment rate generates a 1
percent decrease in real wage. The relative persistence of real wages, wage and price
in￿ation varies with the type of shock hitting the economy. Real wages emerge as spe-
cially persistent following an import price shock, while wage in￿ation displays similar
persistence in the face of import price, unemployment or productivity shocks. In turn,
price in￿ation appears somewhat more persistent in the case of unemployment shocks.
Overall, in terms of long-run persistence, wage and price in￿ation emerge as less per-
sistent in Portugal and the US than in the EA, consistently with the micro evidence
on the frequency of price adjustments.
Recent evidence from both aggregate and disaggregate wage data, however, suggests
that the responsiveness of real wages to unemployment changes may have declined over
the last decade. The indication of a fall in the cyclical sensitivity of wages may be asso-
ciated to the nature of the current mechanisms for wage determination in a low-in￿ation
environment (in particular under severe nominal downward rigidity of wages). Further-
more, the generosity of the unemployment bene￿t system, in particular with respect to
the maximum potential duration of the bene￿ts, by making unemployment less painful,
favours reservation wages which are less sensitive to the rise in unemployment rates. In
this setup, the weaker the e￿ect of unemployment, the smaller will be the decrease in
wages for a given unemployment gap, and the higher will be the level of unemployment
needed to overcome the macroeconomic imbalances.
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